There’s actually “a global trend toward increased air safety,” notes a Wall Street Journal columnist.
And even in the case of the two fatal Boeing crashes five years ago, he stresses that they were “were two different crashes,” with the second happening only “after Boeing and the FAA issued emergency directives instructing pilots how to compensate for Boeing’s poorly designed flight control software.
“The story should have ended after the first crash except the second set of pilots behaved in unexpected, unpredictable ways, flying a flyable Ethiopian Airlines jet into the ground.”
Boeing is guilty of designing a fallible system and placing an undue burden on pilots. The evidence strongly suggests, however, that the Ethiopian crew was never required to master the simple remedy despite the global furor occasioned by the first crash. To boot, they committed an additional error by overspeeding the aircraft in defiance of aural, visual and stick-shaker warnings against doing so. It got almost no coverage, but on the same day the Ethiopian government issued its final findings on the accident in late 2022, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, in what it called an “unusual step,” issued its own “comment” rebuking the Ethiopian report for “inaccurate” statements, for ignoring the crew’s role, for ignoring how readily the accident should have been avoided.
So the Wall Street Journal columnist challenges whether profit incentives played any role in Boeing’s troubles:
In reality, the global industry was reorganized largely along competitive profit-and-loss lines after the 1970s, and yet this coincided with enormous increases in safety, notwithstanding the sausage factory elements occasionally on display (witness the little-reported parking of hundreds of Airbus planes over a faulty new engine).
The point here isn’t blame but to note that 100,000 repetitions likely wouldn’t reproduce the flukish second MAX crash and everything that followed from it. Rather than surfacing Boeing’s deeply hidden problems, it seems the second crash gave birth to them. The subsequent 20-month grounding and production shutdown, combined with Covid, cost Boeing thousands of skilled workers. The pressure of its duopoly competition with Airbus plus customers clamoring for their backordered planes made management unwisely desperate to restart production. January’s nonfatal door-plug blowout of an Alaska Airlines 737 appears to have been a one-off when Boeing workers failed to reinstall the plug properly after removing it to fix faulty fuselage rivets. Not a one-off, apparently, are faulty rivets as Boeing has strained to hire new staff and resume production of half-finished planes.
Boeing will sort out its troubles eventually by applying the oldest of manufacturing insights: Training, repetition, standardization and careful documentation are the way to error-free complex manufacturing.
As he sees it, “The second MAX crash caught Boeing up in a disorienting global media and political storm that it didn’t know how to handle and, indeed, has handled fairly badly.”
Read more of this story at Slashdot.
