Category: china

But this week the U.K. government “has blocked the takeover of the country’s largest microchip factory by a Chinese-owned firm,” CNBC reported this week, “over concerns it may undermine national security.”

Grant Shapps, minister for business, energy and industrial strategy, on Wednesday ordered Dutch chipmaker Nexperia to sell its majority stake in Newport Wafer Fab, the Welsh semiconductor firm it acquired for £63 million ($75 million).

Nexperia is based in the Netherlands but owned by Wingtech, a partially Chinese state-backed company listed in Shanghai. Nexperia completed its acquisition of Newport Wafer Fab in 2021, and the firm subsequently changed its name to Nexperia Newport Limited, or NN.

“The order has the effect of requiring Nexperia BV to sell at least 86% of NNL within a specified period and by following a specified process,” the United Kingdom’s Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy said in a statement. Nexperia had initially owned 14% of Newport Wafer Fab, but in July 2021 it upped its stake to 100%.

“We welcome foreign trade & investment that supports growth and jobs,” Shapps tweeted Wednesday. “But where we identify a risk to national security we will act decisively.”

Nexperia plans to appeal the decision.

According to Kommersant, Russian electronics manufacturers are not enjoying life at all because, on top of high failure rates, gray market gear doesn’t flow with the same speed as legit kit and supply chains are currently very kinked indeed inside Russia. The newspaper lays the blame on economic sanctions that have seen many major businesses quit Russia. Gray market distributors and other opportunistic operators have been left as the only entities willing to deal with Russian businesses. Gray market folks are not renowned for their sterling customer service nor their commitment to quality. They get away with it because buyers of products with — ahem — unconventional origins self-incriminate if they complain to authorities. Perhaps they’re even dumping dud product on Russian buyers, knowing that they can’t easily access alternatives.

“The products have been verified, but they did not go into the production lines when mass production of the new iPhone began,” an unspecified source told Nikkei Asia. Reportedly, the intention had been to initially use YMTC chips only for iPhones being sold in China. Another unnamed source, though, claimed that Apple was considering ultimately buying 40% of all its worldwide iPhone NAND flash memory from the company. “YMTC is government-subsidized so they can really outprice competitors,” said another source.

RISC-V provides China with a shortcut around the laborious prospect of developing their own architecture. “Coming up with a whole new architecture is nearly impossible,” O’Donnell said. But “a design based on some architecture is very different from the architecture itself.” So it should come as no surprise that the majority of RISC-V members are based in China, according to a report published last year. And the country’s government-backed Chinese Academy of Sciences is actively developing open source RISC-V performance processors.

Alibaba’s T-Head, which is already deploying Arm server processors and smartNICs, is also exploring RISC-V-based platforms. But for now, they’re largely limited to edge and IoT appliances. However, O’Donnell emphasizes that there is no technical reason that would prevent someone from developing a server-grade RISC-V chip. “Similar to Arm, many people dismiss RISC-V as underpowered for more demanding applications. They are wrong. Both are architectures, not specific designs. As such, one can design a powerful processor based on either architecture,” he said. […] One of the most attractive things about RISC-V over Softbank-owned Arm is the relatively low cost of building chips based on the tech, especially for highly commoditized use cases like embedded processors, O’Donnell explained. While nowhere as glamorous as something like a server CPU, embedded applications are one of RISC-V’s first avenues into the datacenter. […] These embedded applications are where O’Donnell expects RISC-V will see widespread adoption, including in the datacenter. Whether the open source ISA will rise to the level of Arm or x86 is another matter entirely.

GFW’s analysis of this incident is that “blocking is done by blocking the specific port that the circumvention services listen on. When the user changes the blocked port to a non-blocked port and keep using the circumvention tools, the entire IP addresses may get blocked.” Interestingly, domain names used with these tools are not added to the Great Firewall’s DNS or SNI blacklists, and blocking seems to be automatic and dynamic. “Based on the information collected above, we suspect, without empirical measurement yet, that the blocking is possibly related to the TLS fingerprints of those circumvention tools,” the organization asserts. An alternative circumvention tool, naiveproxy, appears not to be impacted by these changes. “It’s not hard to guess why China might have chosen this moment to upgrade the Great Firewall: the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party kicks off next week,” notes the Register. “The event is a five-yearly set piece at which Xi Jinping is set to be granted an unprecedented third five-year term as president of China.”

The timing is sensitive for Apple, as its suppliers are preparing components that will go into its next iPhones and other new products set to launch this autumn. Using the phrase “Made in Taiwan” on any import declaration forms, documents or cartons could cause shipments to be held and checked by Chinese customs, the sources added. Penalties for violating such a rule is a fine of up to 4,000 yuan ($592) or, in the worst-case scenario, the shipment being rejected, one of the sources said.

Mission managers didn’t screw anything up; this end-of-life scenario is built into the Long March 5B’s design, to the consternation of exploration advocates and much of the broader spaceflight community. This disposal strategy is reckless, critics say, given that the big rocket doesn’t burn up completely upon reentry.

Indeed, 5.5 tons to 9.9 tons (5 to 9 metric tons) of the Long March 5B likely survived all the way to the ground today, experts with The Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Orbital Reentry and Debris Studies have estimated. And it’s possible that falling rocket chunks caused some injuries or infrastructure damage today, given where the Long March 5B reentered. One observer appeared to capture the rocket’s breakup from Kuching, in the Malaysian state of Sarawak, for example, posting video of the dramatic event on Twitter. “The video from Kuching implies it was high in the atmosphere at that time — any debris would land hundreds of km further along track, near Sibu, Bintulu or even Brunei,” astrophysicist and satellite tracker Jonathan McDowell, of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, said via Twitter today. It’s “unlikely but not impossible” that one or more chunks hit a population center, he added in another tweet….

“What really should have happened is, there should have been some fuel left on board for this to be a controlled reentry,” Darren McKnight, a senior technical fellow at the California-based tracking company LeoLabs, said Thursday (July 28) during a Long March 5B reentry discussion that The Aerospace Corporation livestreamed on Twitter. “That would be the responsible thing to do….”

This was the third uncontrolled fall for a Long March 5B core stage to date.

NASA Administrator Bill Nelson also released a critical statement today pointing out that China “did not share specific trajectory information as their Long March 5B rocket fell back to Earth.”

All spacefaring nations should follow established best practices, and do their part to share this type of information in advance to allow reliable predictions of potential debris impact risk, especially for heavy-lift vehicles, like the Long March 5B, which carry a significant risk of loss of life and property.

But some dramatic new examples have been revealed. For example, in 2017 China’s government offered to build a $100 million pavilion in Washington D.C. with an ornate 70-foot pagoda. U.S. counterintelligence officials realized its location — two miles from the U.S. Capitol — appeared “strategically placed on one of the highest points in Washington DC…a perfect spot for signals intelligence collection.”
Also alarming was that Chinese officials wanted to build the pagoda with materials shipped to the US in diplomatic pouches, which US Customs officials are barred from examining, the sources said. Federal officials quietly killed the project before construction was underway…

Since at least 2017, federal officials have investigated Chinese land purchases near critical infrastructure, shut down a high-profile regional consulate believed by the US government to be a hotbed of Chinese spies and stonewalled what they saw as clear efforts to plant listening devices near sensitive military and government facilities.
Among the most alarming things the FBI uncovered pertains to Chinese-made Huawei equipment atop cell towers near US military bases in the rural Midwest. According to multiple sources familiar with the matter, the FBI determined the equipment was capable of capturing and disrupting highly restricted Defense Department communications, including those used by US Strategic Command, which oversees the country’s nuclear weapons…. It’s unclear if the intelligence community determined whether any data was actually intercepted and sent back to Beijing from these towers. Sources familiar with the issue say that from a technical standpoint, it’s incredibly difficult to prove a given package of data was stolen and sent overseas.

The Chinese government strongly denies any efforts to spy on the US…. But multiple sources familiar with the investigation tell CNN that there’s no question the Huawei equipment has the ability to intercept not only commercial cell traffic but also the highly restricted airwaves used by the military and disrupt critical US Strategic Command communications, giving the Chinese government a potential window into America’s nuclear arsenal…. As Huawei equipment began to proliferate near US military bases, federal investigators started taking notice, sources familiar with the matter told CNN. Of particular concern was that Huawei was routinely selling cheap equipment to rural providers in cases that appeared to be unprofitable for Huawei — but which placed its equipment near military assets.